A lot of work in the late 80's and early 90's looked at the genetic development of groups' of individuals (agents^[3]) communicative abilities using genetic^[4] algorithms. It is no coincidence that it was around this time that Pinker and Bloom (1990) burst into flower. It is probably also true that at this time it was widely accepted among linguists/cognitive scientists that there existed some sort of language-specific processing machinery in the brain^[5], as well as a LAD in more than the abstract sense. This approach was also supported by the belief in humans' unique status as owners of a combinatorially rich and unbounded system of communication. There seemed to be only one mechanism for the development of such a system - evolution by natural selection, and consequently it was to genes and genetic mechanisms where we were to look (and so to model). The models created simulate the development of language specific capabilities in the species. Examples of this type of simulation are Hurford (1989, 1991), Werner and Dyer (1991), Lucas (1994) and Hashimoto and Ikegami (1995).

Since that time, however, and possibly thanks in large part to the work and prestige of the scholar Luc Steels, in the past decade there has been a move away from genetic approaches - away from sexual selection of/for abilities/capacities towards a self-organisation approach. The mid-90's saw a good deal of what could be termed genetic assimilation (Baldwinian evolution) modelling approaches. These incorporated genetic aspects and self-organisation aspects. See Batali (1994), Oliphant (1999), Livingstone and Fyfe (2000), Kirby (1998), Kirby and Hurford (1997), Briscoe (1998).

Recently, though, recourse to genetic explanation of any kind has been explicitly rejected in favour of wholly self-organisational approaches (see Steels, 2000), see de Boer (2000, 2001), Hutchins and Hazlehurst (1995), Hurford (2000), Kirby (2000), Batali (1998), Steels (1998), Vogt (2001) among many others. With the shift away from genetic selection to a more consensus-based mechanism there has been a shift from focus on the individual's (agent's) abilities to a focus on the development of the actual communication system (language) itself. An good example here is the "Glossogenetic" approach of Kirby and Hurford (2001, inter alia). This refocussing follows directly from the fact that the agents "capabilities" don't change over time, only the values of certain parameters. The actual values taken by these parameters are usually arbitrary and can change even after a stable system has been obtained. The agents have very little or no language-specific machinery and there is no change in agent architecture as such. There are a number of issues with this move, some of which are discussed below.

These are certainly only tendencies, however, and contradicting examples could easily be found. For example, Cangelosi (2001) is still heavily genetic in approach, and so on. What does seem significant about this is the theoretical shift implied. Many in the field openly reject the Chomskyan innatist view of language ability (e.g., de Boer, 2000; Steels, 2000). If this trend continues and takes hold among linguists we may see a move back to the more learning-based theories of the pre-Chomskyan era. There is evidently a wish to explain as much as possible in non-genetic terms. Having said this, however, most of the scholars would not in any way attempt to deny the importance of genetic factors. I look at this in more detail below.