There are two ways of comprehending an object of interest. One, which is always used by science, is to observe it with sensors of some kind from without. This leads to understanding about the object's size, weight, and so on.

A different approach is to understand an object from within, also called intuition. This approach is less known and in many cases much less developed than an intellectual approach to comprehension. The principle of intuition, thoroughly understood, implies the principle of unity of life. Which, to make it brief, just states that all living beings are related to each other and together form one unit of life.

If we think about it the unity of life must be true, since otherwise it would not be possible for us to relate to each other in any way.

Intuition has many aspects, altough they all are the same in the end: unity The one aspect that results from this and that is of interest to this project is inherent understanding, which comes from within. Such intuitively grasped knowledge is irresistible, it simply is. This is also the difference to scientifically learned knowledge. In science you usually learn something and with intuition you just know.

The G System combines these concepts, the scientific and the intuitional, for the purpose of learning about life as a whole.

Since there is only one whole life, how does it come that we see so many different forms of life? The question actually answers itself, as it says that we see only different "forms" of life. But then, people may say that they just don't feel "whole" with everything else they see.

To answer this, we need to think about consciousness. Life is made up by beings, some of them conscious like humans, some of them unconscious, like plants and most animals. Seeing the wholeness is a matter of being conscious about it. We, as humans, are at least conscious about the fact that we exist. But this doesn't mean that we are conscious about everything. To demonstrate this simply try to figure out what makes up your consciousness... so it seems that we are not fully conscious, which ultimately leads to the conclusion that we have not yet reached our goal of evolution.

Life itself must, in the end, be whole, otherwise we would not be able to interact with our environment. We can conclude this when we think about interaction with our environment. We wouldn't be able to ever sense our environment if we were not connected to it in some way. Nothing, that is not connected to each other at all, can in any way take note or be aware about each other, think about it. This means, that we are somehow connected to each other, thus being part of the same one thing - life.

Now we should probably take a closer look at the process of evolution itself.

Before an universe manifests, life is already there - in an unmanifested but united state. There are many conscious and many unconscious beings in this wholeness. But because nothing is manifested there is no "evolution" taking place.

In order for this wholeness to evolve, the universe needs to manifest itself. In this manifested universe of conscious beings also unconscious entities are taken in which can only become conscious in a manifested universe (see above). But not only these yet unconscious entities become conscious but also the already conscious entities become "more" conscious.

As we have seen separation is what allows for consciousness to evolve. Now let's take a look at densitiy of matter. Atoms, for some time thought as the most elementary building block, consist themselves of smaller building blocks - electrons, protons, neutrons. Lately we heard that even this is not the end, there exist plasma, tachyons and whatever scientists call these building blocks. In addition it is shown that matter actually consists solely of energy. Now, what about these building blocks? It shows that the physical matter (the so called "elements") is the densest part of the universe. In this level of density it is possible to definitely separate forms from each other. This separation is what makes the development of individual consciousness possible.

Life (the unconscious entities) takes form in this separated matter. During a long time these beings are being influenced by external things (separated in form) and are thus able to develop self consciousness which leads to individuality.

Now that the unconscious entities have developed consciousness the goal that still has to be reached is consciousness about life as a whole, which is the goal of evolution - as far as we humans are concerned with it anyway. In the next chapter we will look at this part of evolution.

Computers and computer technologies are now ubiquitous in academia and, indeed, in most areas of modern Western life. While some hold reservations about the true contribution made by computers, many, if not most, believe the limitations for us now are not with computers but with our imagination.

Universities and technical institutes have embraced computer technologies with enthusiasm and many faculties now will not accept essays or assignments if they have not been put through a word-processor. Registration, course information and, increasingly, course content are available through the Internet. The internet has a wealth of information and resources (a good deal of the material for this essay was downloaded from the internet) and in reality it is only cost which inhibits universal access. The real revolution for academia, however, lies not in the mere exchange of words and pictures but in the construction and exploration of new and exciting artificial worlds. It is the relevance and contribution of these artificial realities or simulations to the Evolution of Language (henceforth EOL) debate that is the topic of this essay.

In the first part of this essay I take a look at what a computer simulation^[1] is and in particular what a simulation of the origins and evolution of a language/communication system is. I ask why we would want to build such simulations and look at what modelling opens up to us. Some recent work is reviewed. The essay then moves on to look at tendencies in the field and shifts that appear to be taking place.

In the final section I take a look at some of the theoretical and practical problems that surround simulation work in EOL studies and look at how the work fits in to the overall research enterprise.

Perhaps simulation is not the panacea once hoped for. If we are to build realistic models - and surely we must to attempt to tackle social or cultural questions - then our models will not be simple, and will take considerable time and expense to construct.

At the end of the day, a simulationist can always respond with the claim that, without the sort of groundwork and bank of experience working with low-level, oversimplified models, we will never be able to model more realistic worlds. In the final analysis I would have to agree. Preliminary low-level modelling is necessary. As a linguist and computer scientist, however, I would urge scepticism concerning any results claimed from this early simulation work. It is not clear that the models take enough complexity into account to discover anything we could not have readily predicted from initial conditions. Simulations will develop, though, and it seems only a matter of time before simulation becomes a truly necessary investigative tool. I do believe we will need patience though!

Like much research, however, it seems clear that work on the origins of communication will likely be coopted into the practical world and we may eventually see a forms of computer-computer or even human-computer interaction arising from investigations originated in the EOL debate.

The final message is one of cautious optimism - we stand on the threshold of a new world but it seems that we will need to do a good deal more exploring of this new world before we find any suitable vantage points to look back upon the old.

In this essay I look at the conceptions of evolution by natural selection employed in contributions to the 'origins and evolution of language' debate - in particular, in contributions to Section 1 of Knight, Studdert-Kennedy and Hurford (2000) (henceforth KSH2000). The conceptions in question are characteristic of (almost, see below) all of the contributions to all of the collections resulting from the Evolution of Language conferences, i.e., Hurford, Studdert-Kennedy and Knight (1998), KSH2000, and Wray (2002) (see Knight quote below).

From the outset it will be clear that I take a different view of what constitute the "important" aspects of the work of Charles Darwin. However, at no stage am I directly questioning the validity of Darwin's overall thesis. I merely question how Darwinian concepts should be applied in the context of discussions as to the origin and development of language. And clearly, if we are to apply Darwinian concepts in this context we require to have a clear notion of just what those concepts are.

My essay's main task is to question the utility of the notion of competition/selfishness in discussions of the evolution of language. In section 1 I look closely at the KSH2000 contributions and that show all^[6] of them adhere roughly what we might call "selfish gene" (Dawkins, 1976) theory applied to behaviour ^[7] . My discussion assumes a working knowledge of "selfish gene" Darwinism.

In section 2 I look at a wide variety of cooperative phenomena in Nature and review a number of opinions that appear to directly contradict that part of Darwin's theory which relates to the ubiquity of competition in Nature.

Section 3 ponders how we might understand this apparent contradiction and suggests (in the spirit of the later Wittgenstein) that we think of some of Darwin's terms not in their everyday literal sense, but in a larger metaphorical sense.

What I am offering in sections 2 & 3 of the essay is admittedly a biased and incomplete view of the range of interactions we observe in nature. The bias is deliberate for, especially in an essay of this size, it is unnecessary to show that many interactions in nature are "competitive" (at least in the spirit of Kropotkin (1914^[8][1902]). What I question is whether we should make grandiose statements about the ubiquity, innateness or necessity of competition.

By showing that cooperation is not an aberrant feature of complex human interaction, but rather a feature of many interactions between different species and within species throughout the natural world, I offer a change of perspective. We can thus no longer make claims as to the "basic" cooperativeness or competitiveness of Nature. They exist side by side as valid interpretations we may make from our observations. A more complex and sophisticated understanding of the Struggle for Existence is readily available. We need not have all our intellectual eggs in the "competition" basket. Certainly, though, the range of sensible topics for discussion in the Evolution of Language debate will shift. It will no longer be adequate to assume our predecessors were selfish or competitive and therefore think of the complex system of cooperative communication as anomalous. Instead of inventing highly unintuitive explanations for why we came to control our imagined "savagery", more productive use of our time might be made inquiring as to how we got from how we were then, to how we are now^[9].

The contributors to Part 1 of KSH2000 evidently all regard language as a cooperative enterprise (even if only in the sense of both playing or competing or following rules in a game, cf. Dessalles' contribution). This is, apparently, a very interesting and unexpected phenomenon given the way "Darwinian" evolution works. Here are some examples from the works.

One thing that is clear from the outset is that a model of evolution by natural selection has been uncritically adopted, and the apparent "anomaly" observed with language is a direct result of adopting this theory. In the following sections I show that there is good reason to reject the theory of evolution adopted as it is manifestly inadequate as an explanatory framework - competition/selfishness is simply not as ubiquitous as the theory requires/predicts. Having adopted this theory it is now up to the authors to provide mechanisms by which the predictions of the theory can be brought into line with observed reality. Humans are very cooperative now, and language is a very cooperative enterprise and must have been from the start. All of the works cited from above will reduce in relevance dramatically if it can be shown that in fact there is no "anomaly" to explain.

In fact, the particular view of evolution adopted by the contributors to Part 1 of KSH2000 (as with most of the participants in the discussion as a whole), is controversial and much criticised. Later I look at some of these criticisms and show that many of the questionable claims arise from reading concepts meant as metaphors literally.

To begin with let us go directly to the source of theorising on evolution and inquire as to what Darwin had to say about cooperation. We might sum up his theory in the following (his) words:

Though extensive use is made of the term 'competition' in The Origin of Species from the preceding extract it should be clear that the only arena we can suggest there will be 'competition' is within the "struggle for life", or Darwin's "Struggle for Existence" which we will deal with in Section 2. It is only here where we could possibly interpret some resistance to cooperation.

Having had a brief look at the rudiments of "Darwinism" I would now like to go on the offensive and provide evidence that we should not interpret "Struggle for Existence" as meaning competition, certainly not in its everyday sense of the term. Later, in section 3 we will see why, if we should not think in terms of the everyday sense of competition, that using the term so liberally has lead us to error.

First of all let us look at some evidence that suggests, contrary to lay-notions of the interactions of organisms in the environment, that instead of competition between species it is far more accurate to regard the fundamental principle of Nature as the avoidance of competition. This is known to ecologists as the Exclusion Principle. What it states is that for every niche there will be one, and only one, species. While this may seem a tad vacuous on the surface of things - a species is usually defined using the concept of niche so it is somewhat of a tautology - it does serve to bring into focus the fact that organisms specialise. Quite contrary to Darwin's early claims about similar species competing for the same resources, Nature shows that similar organisms will keep to very defined and delimited ranges and resources in order to avoid competition (Colinvaux, 1980). Colinvaux (1980:130) recounts the following investigation on warblers in eastern Canada and New England, USA:

Robert MacArthur earned his doctorate answering these (among other) questions and after considerable observation found that:

There is only one interpretation for this situation (Colinvaux gives many other examples of such behaviour in Chapter 13 of the mentioned work) and the prominent ecologist is quite emphatic in his reading:

Given the obvious reverence for Darwin, the absence of the concepts like competition, manipulation or conflict is at first glance surprising. It is well known that Darwin was indeed quite Hobbesian in his terminology, often speaking of wars and struggle, but it is patently obvious that the facts are the facts, and both Darwin and Colinvaux are from the same planet - putting those facts into the understandable form of a model are where the differences lie. Colinvaux puts a quite different spin on what goes on in Nature. On the surface it appears that, at least for different species, Colinvaux directly contradicts Darwin. We should understand how appearances can be somewhat deceiving after Section 3.

Further evidence that conflict is avoided in nature comes from Augros and Stanciu (1992:128).

Now that we have seen how organisms of similar species avoid competition it seems legitimate to inquire whether they might "cooperate" or "collaborate", giving rise to further doubt the utility of the theory of "Selfishness". Here we must think a little and ask ourselves which organisms are most likely to be advantaged by the help of another species. Will it be similar species? Will they be quite different? After a moment's reflection it is apparent that it is far more likely to find cooperative endeavours among either members of ones own species, or those of a species with quite different morphologies and abilities. It is, after all, obvious that if one needs something done to one, then either a member of ones own species will be most intimately knowledgeable of the exigencies of the situation and will be most helpful or, if the task is beyond them due to size or mobility or other constraint, then a quite different being will be better suited to aid. I will first look at the situation where the beings are quite different.

In spite of what is predicted by what Hobbes called the "war of all against all", indeed we find many examples of such "helping" or "cooperation" between largely different species.

The phenomenon, more often going under the name of "symbiosis" or "mutual interdependence", is in fact very widespread. By changing our point of view we can understand just how deep this goes. I mention a few examples, all sorted and paraphrased from Augros and Stanciu (1992), and then come to some conclusions as to its importance.

Inouye (1984) talks of the relationship between the aspen sunflower of the Rocky Mountains and a species of ant. The ants are provided with a good deal of their nutritional requirements through extrafloral nectar secretions and in turn the ants provide protection from harmful parasites.

A fantastic number of plants require bees, moths, bats or others in order to cross-pollinate and provide a delicious meal of nectar for their trouble. The purpose of most fleshy fruit is in fact to entice large mobile creatures to consume the seed, take it away and fertilise it. In doing this these creatures are provided with their sustenance. In an even more dependent relationship the olive fruit (among many others), requires the digestive action of certain birds (or a chemical process mimicking this) to soften the shell before the seed can germinate.

Phoresis, or using other animals for transport and dispersal, has a very long history and is widespread. It enables "stationary" creatures, like sea anemones, to obtain food by constantly being taken about on mobile creatures, like on the backs of crabs, and crabs are given a degree of camouflage, which helps in avoiding predators. Many insects and worms hitchhike to more promising habitats.

The list of examples goes on and on. We haven't even mentioned bacteria in stomachs, mitochondria (see Sagan and Margulis, 1992) or microbes associated with trees! When we consider the bigger picture this leads to the realisation that in fact all animals require all plants - oxygen and carbon dioxide being taken and given respectively. In short, it is impossible to find an organism that doesn't rely for its life on at least one other organism. The earth's entire biosphere forms one big cooperative mass of organisms. This view is often associated with the "Gaia Hypothesis" of biological interconnectedness (Lovelock, 1979).

Having seen how closely some species rely on others we see can now appreciate how Augros and Stanciu (1992:131) can claim "Nature is not a war of one organism against another, but an alliance founded on cooperation."

Yet we are still to drive the point home. It is entirely possible that the "selfish" theorists will acknowledge cooperation (collaboration) in members of different species, it is merely species "exploiting" each other or the like. The key for both Darwin and the neo-Darwinist sociobiologists is not that there will be competition between species but that species internal competition will indeed be dire. Darwin is clear on this point (see below). What we would expect to find then is that members of a species are in constant conflict and competition. Any behaviour that looks as if it doesn't positively harm others (or at least non-kin) is not predicted. We should be clear on this point. If organisms (or even genes) are selfish at base and in competition then the theory predicts that we should find no behaviour or faculties that assist non-kin and we should often find behaviour that directly downgrades or degenerates the fitness (manipulation and deceit fit in here) of other organisms.

This, surprisingly or not, is not what we find in Nature. Examples of assistance of non-kin are legion and only the tip of the iceberg can be treated in an essay of this kind. Here are a few arenas sociobiology must explain using sometimes fantastical (cf. Schwartz, 1986, on sociobiology's claims to "science" status or Sahlins, 1976) means.

Adoption. Adoption is a widespread and common phenomenon given the right circumstances. It is well known that many mammals will adopt the young of other animals: cats, dogs, cows and pigs have been known to adopt rats, pigs, rabbits, cats, and dogs (though not, of course, in all combinations, Burton, 1978:12). Humans have been raised by wolves and apes, among others. Adoption of another mothers progeny (i.e., containers of the enemy's genes, or enemy gene) is known in apes (the famous Kanzi was an adoptee, Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin, 1994) and cows (Burton, 1978:15) at least, and probably many others, given what is known about midwifery practises (see below).

Adoption is well known in many human societies, including many cultures where infanticide is practised. An horrendous fact to explain for the sociobiologists is a culture where ones own progeny are sometimes killed and the children of ones enemies are taken on as ones own! While sometimes the children are treated as slaves when "adopted" in this fashion, this is certainly not always the case (Schwartz, 1986). Adoption of animals by humans is also a phenomenon we should not forget (useless for all intents and purposes for creatures like cats and certainly for parrots).

Midwifery and post-natal care (from Burton, 1978:chap. 20). The practice of aiding non-kin females in parturition is found in many species of mammal - elephants, rhinoceroses, cows, dolphins, giraffes, mice, rats, marmosets, monkeys among others. As Burton (p177) notes "Looking at the history of our knowledge of the natal and post-natal care among mammals, it seems likely that eventually both will be found to be far more common than is at the moment supposed." The help ranges from protection from predators to resuscitation of young and other immediate needs a mother may not be able to provide (for some reason or other). "Young hippopotamuses within a colony spend much time in the care of one female while their mothers are away feeding" (p181) and penguins are known to leave their offspring in large groups to go and feed and return to collect them later.

Feeding and alarm calls. (Excepting humans for the sake of brevity) many animals show cooperation in feeding. Chimpanzees utter "pant hoots" to others when they find a tree with enough fruit for others (Mitani, 1994). There are a great number of species of mammals and birds that display sentinel behaviour and utter alarm calls. While there may be some evidence, in some species, that alarm calls are preferentially made in the presence of kin (Carroll and Loye,1992), there is little or none that suggests a positive abstention from alarm calling when kin are not present, and, if we are going to be exact, this is what a "selfish" theory predicts. Alarm calling in the sole presence of non-kin is going to be so dis-advantageous as to be impossible in Nature, if all organisms (or genes), at base, desire the destruction of their congeners. Perhaps most startling of all the examples of food sharing or mutual care, however, is that of female vampire bats (Desmodus Rotundus)(see Carroll and Loye, 1992) in tropical American forests. Bats starve to death in as little as three days and about a third of the under-two year old bats and just less than 10% of adult bats fail to feed in any given night. Not feeding on a given night puts a bat in a dangerous state. It was found that bats form bonds (with kin AND non-kin) with others and will regurgitate a meal for unfed bats, usually for another member of this group of "friends". Experiments were carried out and bats were removed from their group. Those who were starved were fed upon rejoining the group and those who were fed were not (Wilkinson, 1984, cited in Carroll and Loye, 1992). Again, this counts strongly against the predictions of the sociobiologists.

Kropotkin (1914[1902]:59) recounts several examples of blind animals being fed by seeing mates (whether kin or not is not mentioned), and Burton (1978:chap. 9) mentions several examples of blind animals being helped in other ways.

On top of all this non-conflictual (helping, cooperative, collaborative, etc.) behaviour we have human cooperation. Unparalleled in its complexity and ubiquity, humans are in many ways best thought of not as individual beings but as integral parts of a group - not having a real existence outside of this group (see the work of Malinowski, for example). What we have seen, however, is that human cooperation/collaboration is not unique. While it may be justifiable to attempt to explain cooperative behaviours in a single species as aberrant, it is somewhat intellectually irresponsible to cling to a theory which needs to make room for so many exceptions.

Let us now return to Darwin and look at little closer at what he meant by "Struggle for Existence". It is here, as we noted above, that notions of competition/conflict enter the discussion. So how could Darwin, a scholar who had spent many years out in the field observing miss so many glaring examples of the "peaceful coexistence" - not only between species but also within them? It would be cruel of fate to have treated him thus. But did he really miss out? The key is to be found in Darwin's own (1988[1859]:47) explanation of his term "Struggle for Existence". (I quote at length to do him justice):

Among the things this passage brings to light, most importantly, we see that he is keenly aware of the fact that some of the terms he uses cannot be understood in the context of the animal world as they are understood in the human world. We see, in particular, that he was aware that we would be stretching the term "Struggle" to try and account for all observable behaviour. Though I am not aware of anywhere where he mentions the metaphorical nature of his use of the term 'competition', were we to take him to task, the above passage suggests he would certainly make it clear that the two senses of competition, human (basically economic) and "natural" are not to be equated. Certainly one of the most famous early attempts to clarify/refine Darwinism is Prince Kropotkin's 1902, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution. Kropotkin devotes a number of pages to illustrate just how we should take Darwin's notion of "Struggle". Characteristic of the intellectual giant he was, Kropotkin makes the piercing observation:

From this we can further isolate where competition has its place in Darwin's theory of evolution. Clearly, the notion of competition has little utility in the collective, "metaphorical" struggle against the environment. It is in the struggle for food and safety among separate individuals where we should find it. Kropotkin notes on this count that

Kropotkin then moves on to question the reliability of his interpretation of competition of similar varieties, and with the benefit of hindsight, we must certainly concur in our judgement with Kropotkin - a basic principle of ecology, the Exclusion Principle (see above), states that similar varieties/species will impinge to a negligible degree on the niches of others. Kropotkin also picks up on Darwin's (and Wallace's) use of the term "extermination", brought in to explain away the absence of intermediary forms/transitional varieties, which are predicted by the theory. He goes into great depth to show that "It can by no means be understood in its direct sense, but must be taken "in its metaphoric sense"" (Kropotkin, 1914[1902]:64). The overzealous use of the term by Darwin is attributed to his focussing on the uncommon occurrence of the sudden appearance of a new variety of some species in a given area (with no real hope of moving for the current inhabitants) - assuming that no other variables have changed. Far more likely and common will be the situation where more of a "new, better-adapted variety would survive every year, and the intermediate links would die in the course of time, without having been starved out by Malthusian competitors" (Kropotkin, 1914[1902]:66).

This raises an important point that can now be addressed. What do we really mean when we say compete? Struggle? Exterminate? Are these not loaded terms? Can we escape from anthropomorphising, or are we doomed to make do with a language that we must accept as permanently imbued with human constructs? For on one side it is hardly debateable - animals do not exterminate in the same way humans do. What an animal does is eat, sleep and procreate. The animals have no conception of "killing all the competitors", competing or even "struggle". They simply do, and on a very basic level. What this means is that we must very carefully study the metaphors and constructs we use in describing the world around us in order to avoid the errors that we certainly commit by transferring what we can infer in one context to another. This is the gift Wittgenstein gave us that many are yet to fully understand. The case in point here is that of the "selfish gene". Are we to understand genes as being really and truly "selfish"? We might ask: How can a gene possibly be selfish? Can a gene know? Or desire? Or for that matter, how can a gene do anything? I believe what Dawkins has offered us is the chance to regard certain aspects of what we know about genes as if they were the result of rational, selfish thought. Rational, human behaviour certainly can be selfish. Therefore, we will understand in our human way better if we think of genes as if they were rational and selfish. What we must not then do is assume that those things that we associate with human selfishness are "predicted" by our "theory". If we know that a human is selfish we may certainly inquire, when he behaves cooperatively, as to his motives and how he might be manipulating or deceiving his consorts. It is a grave error, however, to enquire as to how a gene will manipulate or deceive when we know that it only appears as if it were "selfish".

Burton (1978:169) puts it succinctly when he says:

It certainly appears, then, that the contributors have committed the recently mentioned error, and are taking metaphors literally. If humans really were selfish, manipulative and egotistical at base, then we would legitimately be baffled at how cooperative communication developed. We see now, however, that the assumption that they are such is based on an untenable (or at least metaphorical) view of the interaction of organisms in Nature.

This essay has looked at a range of evidence suggesting that the view of evolution taken by many of the contributors to the Evolution of Language series is biased and confused. That view fails to take into account the ubiquity of cooperation, collaboration and symbiosis present in Nature and claims to be able to explain away what cooperation it does acknowledge as "anomalous". Due to constraints on the size of this essay, I have been able to do little more than scratch the surface as to the extent of cooperative behaviour in Nature. I invite the reader to look up some of the works referenced throughout this work. Nevertheless, I believe my essay contains sufficient evidence to raise serious doubts as to the propriety of taking "selfish gene" Darwinism as our starting point. We must at least be on the defensive against taking metaphors too literally.

Carroll and Loye (1992:137) sum it up best when they say:

The sooner we realise that organisms are not best seen as products of their "selfish genes", the sooner we can get on to asking the important questions about how language came about.